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COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES IN RECOGNITION
OF STUDENT LAWYERING
Programs of clinical instruction are increasingly regarded as an
important supplement to traditional legal education.1 The clinical
movement emerged from two independent sources: a recognition
that the clinical setting may be better suited than the classroom to
fostering practical skills and developing professional responsibility,2
and an increased awareness of the need to improve the delivery of
legal services to all sectors of society.3 Unlike their counterparts
in the classroom, law students in clinical programs render legal
services to real clients with real legal problems.4 The students
thereby gain valuable practical experience and provide legal as-
sistance to persons whose needs otherwise would remain unmet.
The concern for broader availability of legal services has caused
changes in the structure of the legal system as well. An example
of such change is the proliferation of statutory provisions allowing
I See, e.g., Burger, The Future of Legal Education, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR PnOFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY & INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER,
SELECTED READINGS IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 49 (1973) (advocating increased
clinical education); Rubin, The View From the Bench, in CoUNciL ON LEGAL EDU-
CATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, INC., CLINIcAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW
STUDENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 251 (1973) (working papers
prepared for CLEPR National Conference in Buck Hill Falls, Pennsylvania, June
6-9, 1973). For articles and comments discussing the purpose and importance of
clinical legal education, see generally F. KLEIN, S. LELEo & J. MAvTY, BAR
ADmissIr RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE RuLEs, 983-88 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as F. KLEIN] (bibliography); Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction:
Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 68 (1979); Gee & Jackson,
Bridging the Cap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv.
695, 881-92; Snyman, A Proposal for a National Link-up of The New Legal Services
Corporation Law Offices and Law School Clinical Training Programs, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 43, 56-66 (1979) (bibliography).
2
AsSOCrATION OF AMERCAN LAV ScHooLs-A~mnCAN BAn AssocIATIoN CoM-
.nfTTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, GuiDromEs FOR CLINICAL
LEGAL EDuCATION 7-8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES]. See Vetri, On
Teaching Professional Responsibility Through Clinical Legal Education Programs,
in COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIBILITY, INC., CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAw STuDENT 70 (1973) (proceedings of CLEPR conference
in Buck Hill Falls, June 1973) [hereinafter cited as Buck Hill Falls Proceedings].
Recent proposals have recommended instruction in trial advocacy as a requirement
for admission to practice before federal courts. See GuIDELUNS, supra, at 8 & n.12.
3 GumIELInEs, supra note 2, at 7-8. Justice Brennan has described clinical
programs as an important source of legal representation for the indigent. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 15-37. For interesting descriptions of
clinical programs, see Meltsner & Schrag, Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
1 (1978) (Columbia University's Morningside Heights Legal Services Corporation);
Subin, Directing and Managing Legal Education in a Service Setting, in Buck Hill
Falls Proceedings, supra note 2, at 57, 64 (New York University's Criminal Law
Clinic).
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courts to award attorneys' fees to litigants who successfully vindicate
their rights under certain statutory schemes.5 These provisions,
along with equitable doctrines allowing courts to award fees, have
increased the availability of legal services for the indigent by pro-
viding incentives for such persons to seek, and for attorneys to pro-
vide, legal representation on a cost-free basis."
This Comment discusses the appropriateness of awarding at-
torneys' fees to law school legal clinics in recognition of the lawyer-
ing services of students enrolled in them. The analysis is limited
to law school legal clinics in which students, by virtue of special
authorization,7 are allowed to provide indigent clients with legal
services that otherwise could be performed only by licensed
attorneys.8
The issue is a novel one. Although courts occasionally have
awarded attorneys' fees to university-affiliated legal assistance offices
based on the supervising attorney's work,9 and in some instances
5 The most far-reaching provision is The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-599, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976)). Its sponsor in the Senate, Senator Tunney, explained:
In the typical case... the citizen whose rights have been violated has
little or no money with which to hire a lawyer, and there is often no
damage claim from which an attorney could draw his fee. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their rights under these laws-if those
who violate these most basic human freedoms are not to proceed with
impunity-then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it
costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
121 CoNG. Ruc. 26,806 (1975). For a list of the more than 100 other federal
provisions authorizing attorneys' fees awards, see Award of Attorneys' Fees Against
the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 611-29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
S. 265].
e For a discussion of the effect of attorneys' fees on the availability of legal
representation, see The Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation:
Hearings Before the-Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
7See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
8 The analysis is limited for several reasons. First, only when students actually
perform lawyering services for clients may attorneys' fees in direct recognition of
their'efforts properly be considered. Some jurisdictions permit students to render
such services only in law school legal services offices. See, e.g., D.C. Cm. R. 20;
D. HAwAII R. 1(1); F. KLiai, supra note 1, at 960-77. Second, some jurisdictions
limit the scope of representation to indigent, clients. See, e.g., 3D Cm. R. 9(3);
D.N.H. R. 5(c); F. KImN, supra note 1, at 960-77. Although the clinic's organiza-
tion'or its clients' fiancial status may not be crucial to a resolution of the issue,
the restrictive definition used here may produce a more generally applicable analysis:
it avoids those variables, such as a broader scope of representation which might
include nonindigent clients, that will not apply to all clinical settings.
9 Loney v.'Scurr, 494 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Merchaidise Nat'l
Bank v. Scanlon, 86 111. App. 3d 719, 408 N.E.2d 248 (1980); Darmetko v.
Boston Hous. Auth., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. i.159, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979).
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have increased the amount of these awards in recognition of law
students' efforts,10 no court has recognized a student as the "at-
torney" for the purpose of awarding attorneys' fees. -
Including the lawyering services of students in computing fee
awards could permit law school clinics to assume a larger role in
the advancement of important public policies by encouraging liti-
gants to vindicate their rights. Fee awards also. could provide uni-
versities with funding to support clinical education. As clinical
programs expand, both in number 12 and in the range of clients
and matters they serve,'3 and as statutes allowing attorneys' fees
proliferate,14 the issue will become increasingly important.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes law school clinical
programs and the student's role within them. Part II discusses
some of the doctrines and statutory provisions allowing fee awards,
10 Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2159, 393 N.E.2d 395
(1979). But see Loney v. Scurr, 494 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Iowa 1980); cf. CTS
Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp., 476 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying fees
to compensate for law student services rendered to corporation counsel).
11 The importance of this potential source of funding cannot be overstated.
Clinical education is expensive; schools may be tempted to curtail it in times of
financial stress. See generally CouNcm oN LEGAL EDUcAmO-i FOR PROFESSIbNAL
RESPoNSIBILITY, INc., SURVEY AND DIRECToRY OF CLINIcAL LEGAL EDUCATION
1978-1979 xxvii (1979); deL Swords & Wawer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Education,
in GumEtins, supra note 2, at 133.
12 See COUNcIL ON LEGAL EDUCA'nON Fot PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILITy, INC.,
SuvEy AN DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1976-1977 iv-viii (1977).
13 See GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 88 (encouraging removal of restrictions,
such as indigency requirements, on the scope of representation and noting that by
1979 the ABA model student practice rule, as well as nine state and thirteen
federal student practice rules, authorized student representation regardless of
clients' indigency).
14 Increasingly, Congress has incorporated fee awards provisions as essential
elements in statutory schemes. See supra note 5. Congress also has expanded
the authority of federal courts and agencies to award attorneys' fees in proceedings
to which the United States is a party. The Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-481, § 201-208i 94 Stat 2321, 2325 (1980) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 5, 26, 28, 41 U.S.C.), authorizes fee' awards to parties who prevail in
agency adjudications and provides for awards against the United States in civil
actions. Other measures that have been considered in recent years include bills
that in some circumstances would award fees to public participants in -agency
rulemaking and would provide for fee reimbursement to citizens seeking review
of agency actions in federal court. See, e.g., S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R.
3361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 3263, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess.; H.R. Rm. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). For discussion and
evaluation of these and similar measures, see Regulation Reform Act of 1979:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979-1980);
Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2
(1979); The Awarding of Attorneys' Fees in Federal Courts: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm on the judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-1978).
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paying particular attention to the policies underlying them to dem-
onstrate that fee awards recognizing student services will help to-
implement those policies. Part III examines cases in which at-
torneys' fees awards have been sought for the services of someone
other than a licensed attorney to determine whether fee awards
based on student services are consistent with these decisions. Part
IV concludes that attorneys' fees in recognition of student lawyering
should be awarded.
I. THE LAW STUDENT'S ROLE IN THE LAW SCHOOL LEGAL CLINIC
The general objectives of clinical education may be furthered
through student participation in a number of different activities.'
Interviewing, fieldwork, legal and factual analysis, and drafting and
reviewing documents all permit the student to gain the practical ex-
perience that the classroom cannot provide. The most significant
elements of participation in clinical courses, however, are the op-
portunities for the student to counsel his or her clients,16 to nego-
tiate on their behalf,' 7 and to represent them in formal legal pro-
ceedings."" In so doing, the student most fully acts as an attorney,
performing tasks not readily equated with the work undertaken
by clerks or paralegals.
Each jurisdiction must authorize student participation in these
activities.'" Qualified students generally must be certified, usually
by the court clerk on the recommendation of the law school's
Dean.20 Malpractice insurance sometimes must be carried to cover
the student,2' and he or she may be required to be familiar with
15 See GuImELNEs, supra note 2, at 12-14.
Il Some federal and state courts specifically allow certified students to counsel
their clients. See, e.g., D. H.AwArr R. 1(1)(5); F. Kr.uNr, supra note 1, at 917,
924, 946 n.36, 950 n.87. See also E.D. PA. R. 12F (authorizing students to "engage
in all activities on behalf of [their] client[s] that a licensed attorney may engage in").
17 Some courts permit students to negotiate for their clients. See, e.g., D.
HAA AI R. 1(1)(5); F. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 918, 924, 946 nA1, 950 n.86.
18 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. In addition to allowing court
appearances, many states have allowed students to appear before other tribunals,
such as administrative agencies. See F. KLEiN, supra note 1, at 916.
19Authorization may be by statute, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-401.1 to .2
(1973 & Supp. 1981), or by court rule, see, e.g., E.D. PA. R. 12. Without such
authorization, student representation of clients would constitute the unauthorized
practice of law. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.23 (West 1981); N.Y. Jun.
LA w § 478 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice
of law).
20 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §9-401.1(i) (1973); ABA MODEL STUDENT
PsAcn'rcn RULE §§ III, IV, reprinted in F. KLEmN, supra note 1, at 993, 994.
21 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-401.1(g) (1973); F. KLEIN, supra note 1, at
919, 947 n.48. The GumLIES, supra note 2, at 91-92, recommend that all clinical
programs carry malpractice insurance for students.
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the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 Some states have brought
certified students within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 23
Court appearances are liberally sanctioned. At least forty-four
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have allowed
certified students to appear in court.24 On the federal level, twenty-
four district courts and four courts of appeals 25 have followed the
recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States
and provided for student practice.2 Appellate work, including
oral argument, often is permitted.27
The degree of supervision required over these students varies
-with the jurisdiction and the matter at issue. For example, the
American Bar Association Model Student Practice Rule,28 upon
which some states have patterned their rules, allows unsupervised
student appearances on behalf of indigent clients in any civil mat-
ter 29 or in any criminal matter in which the defendant does not
have a right to counsel,30 provided that the client has consented.
Maryland requires personal supervision of all courtroom appear-
ances by students,3 1 whereas Massachusetts 32 and New Hampshire 3
have provided that a supervising attorney need offer only general
supervision, which does not require physical presence in court.
These provisions illustrate the varying circumstances in which
a law student is allowed to function as an attorney in order to
render a variety of legal services to his or her client; they raise the
question whether courts should recognize students' services for the
purpose of awarding attorneys' fees.
22At least twenty-one states have required students to read the Code of
Professional Responsibility. F. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 921, 948 n.59. Four of
these and six additional states have required students to take oaths affirming their
familiarity with the Code. Id. 922, 949 n.65. See also GurDELnsEs, supra note 2,
at 27 ("[a] student participating in a client clinic assumes responsibility to act in
accordance with the applicable code of professional responsibility").
2 3 Arizona, Ohio, and Texas have done so. See F. Kr.zmx, supra note 1, at
918-19.
2 4 See the list compiled in F. KLwN, supra note 1, at 960-69.
25Id. 972-81.
2 6 
An, mrsrAvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDI Ns OF THE JuDicIAL CoNFERENcE OF T UNTED STATES 80-81 (1971).
2 7 See, e.g., 3D Cm. R. 9(3); 4TH Cm. R. 13; D.C. Cm. R. 20.
28 ABA MODEL STUDENT PRACnicE RULE, reprinted in F. KL.En, supra note 1,
at 993-95.
29 ABA MODEL STuDENT PRACnCE Ruiz §II(A)(1), reprinted in F. KLrm-,
.supra note 1, at 993, 994.
30 ld. § II(A)(2).
81 MD. RULES FOR BAR AD uSsioN CODE ANN. Rule 18(d) (1981).
-32 F. KLEN, supra note 1, at 1064-65.
33 Id. 1084.
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II. BASES FOR COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES
As a general rule, a successful litigant in American courts
bears the costs of his or her legal representation.3 A number of
exceptions to this principle, however, have been created either
through the equitable powers of the courts or by statute. This
section describes in general terms those exceptions and the policies
underlying them, with particular attention to the exceptions that
are relevant to a law school legal clinic.
A. Equitable Doctrines
Notwithstanding the general rule against recovery of attorneys'
fees from losing opponents, the federal courts have long recognized
their inherent power to order such recovery "when the interests of
justice so require." 35 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society,3 6 the Supreme Court identified three distinct equitable
rationales courts have used for this purpose: the bad faith exception,
the common benefit theory, and the private attorney general
doctrine.
The bad faith rationale allows a court, in the exercise of its
equity powers, to award attorneys' fees to a party whose "opponent
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons . . . ." 7 The doctrine applies to two types of conduct: that
which induces litigation and that which occurs during litigation.
34 The rule was first articulated in 1796 in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306 (1796), and has been followed since that time. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975). The rule is generally
supported on two grounds: that it would be unfair to penalize an honest litigant
for bringing a claim or offering a defense, and that to hold a party liable for the
victor's legal fees would deter the poor from vindicating their rights in court.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
The American rule has met with substantial criticism. Opponents have accused
the rule of failing to serve its objectives and have advocated replacing it with a
general rule awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. lh-v. 792
(1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L.
REv. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an
Element of Damages, 15 MmsN. L. Bmv. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of
Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FoPrIas L. Rv.
761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38
U. COLO. L. Rv. 202 (1966).
35 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1972). The Court declared that this power is
derived from "the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular
situation." Id. (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).
8421 U.S. 240 (1974).
37 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974). See generally 6 J. MooRE, W. TAGGAIT & J. Wicxn, Mooux's FED-
uLat. PEAcnE 154.77(2) (2d ed. 1976).
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The first occurs when a party blatantly refuses to respect another's
legal rights, thereby forcing that person to sue to enforce those
rights.38 The second occurs during the litigation when either
party engages in unnecessarily obnoxious conduct, such as filing
groundless motions, impeding discovery, failing to stipulate to
matters not genuinely at issue, or otherwise displaying general
obstinancy.39
An award of fees in either situation serves two purposes. It
reimburses the injured party for the unnecessary litigation ex-
penses; 40 by punishing the wrongful conduct, it seeks to deter
similar conduct in the future.41 This rationale for fee awards,
therefore, reflects considerations broader than the particular finan-
cial relationship between attorney and client.
The common benefit exception, which is founded on principles
of unjust enrichment,4 2 allows a court to award fees to a successful
aSSee, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Richardson v.
Communications Workers, 530 F.2d 126, 131-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
824 (1976); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546-48 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st
Cir. 1971); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951); Guardian Trust Co. v.
Kansas City Southern By., 28 F.2d 233, 240 (8th Cir. 1928); Miller v. Carson, 401
F. Supp. 835, 853-57 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd in part, modified in part and re-
manded on different grounds, 563 F2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Sims v. Amos, 340
F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
39 See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078, 1087-89 (2d Cir. 1977); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir.
1974); Red School House, Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp.
1177, 1196-98 (D. Minn. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 371 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (N.D.
Miss. 1973), vacated and remanded, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975), opinion on
remand, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976); aff'd in part, ree'd in part, and re-
manded, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977).
Bad faith conduct during discovery can lead to an award of attorneys' fees.
See FaE. R. Crv. P. 37(c) (allowing a party to request payment of expenses, in-
eluding attorneys' fees, incurred in proving genuineness or truth, when his opponent
in a Rule 36 request for discovery denies the genuineness of a document or the
truth of a matter of fact). For a discussion of the complexities of judicial deter-
mninations under the bad faith rule, see Comment, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith,
and Awards of Attorneys" Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1979).
40Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962) ("As a result of that re-
calcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what was
plainly owed him"); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974).
41 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981,
991-92 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980). Some state rules
establish a bad faith standard similar to that of the federal rule. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. §20-1404 (1977); ILi. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §41 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §28-26-31 (1974). Other states allow attorneys' fees
awards at the general discretion of the court See, e.g., OR. RLv. STAT. § 20.010
(1979). See generally Comment, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception, 29 HAsTNGs LJ. 319 (1977).
42 Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
H v. L. REv. 849, 850 (1975). See RESTATMNT OF REsTrrUTION § 1 (1937).
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party whose suit results in the enrichment of others as well. Fees
then may be recovered from that benefited class.43  The common
benefit exception applies only when "a litigant confers a substan-
tial benefit on an easily identifiable class . . . where the benefit
can be traced with reasonable accuracy, and the costs of litigation
can be shifted with some exactitude, to those benefiting." 44 The
doctrine originated in cases in which the suit created a common
fund that a specific group could use; 45 it was later expanded to
include cases producing a benefit, but no specific pool of funds.
4
6
Most recently, the exception has been applied to suits under the
Landrum-Griffin Act: 47 successful suits by specific union members
are considered to benefit all members of the union.48
Before A lyeska, the courts used the private attorney general
doctrine to justify awards of attorneys' fees to litigants who had
created benefits, not for a discrete group, but for the public at
large.49 These litigants were seen as "private attorneys general"
who through their own effort furthered important public inter-
ests.-5  The Alyeska Court disapproved of this doctrine, not be-
cause its underlying reasoning was unsound, but because the courts
are without authority to judge some statutes more important than
4 3See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882) ("He has worked for
them as well as for himself . . . they ought to contribute their due proportion of
the expenses which he has fairly incurred."). See generally Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Hlv. L. REv. 658,
662-63 (1956); Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 328-36 (1971).
44 Stevens v. Municipal Court, 603 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1979).
4 See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
46 See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 7 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). For an exhaustive treatment of this doctrine and
criticism of its inappropriate application, see Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 H~nv. L. RBv. 1597 (1974).
47 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)).
48 See, e.g., Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10,
605 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); Brennan v.
United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 977
(1978); McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817
(1976); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 918 (1972); Hummel v. Brennan, 469 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
49The public, however, does not pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees; the de-
fendant does. For general discussion of the doctrine, see Note, Awarding Attorneys'
Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation
in the Public Interest, 24 HAsrTNGs LJ. 733 (1973); Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rzv. 636, 655-81
(1974).
oThe doctrine was formulated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
[Vol. 130' 161
ATTORNEYS' FEES
others, and to allocate attorneys' fees accordingly, without legisla-
tive guidance.51
B. Statutory Provisions: The Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act
No fewer than one hundred federal statutes 52 contain provi-
sions allowing or requiring courts to award attorneys' fees to parties
who prevail in proceedings brought under them. Underlying
many of these provisions are the notions that private enforcement
is essential to the promotion of the substantive statutory scheme
and that the potential award of attorneys' fees encourages private
enforcement. 53
The statute most significant to law school clinics was enacted
in direct response to Alyeska: the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act (Fees Act).54  Congress found that the Court's deci-
sion in A lyeska had created "anomalous gaps" in the policies under-
lying the civil rights laws.5 5 The Fees Act, therefore, allows liti-
gants prevailing on claims under certain enumerated statutes 56 to
collect attorneys' fees from the losing party.
The Fees Act serves the basic goal of the civil rights laws-
discouraging violations of individuals' civil rights-in two re-
51Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263-64. The private attorney general doctrine may
still be applicable in the state courts. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,
569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
52 For a list of these provisions, see Hearings on S. 265, supra note 5, at 611-29.
53 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572 (Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act); S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-20 (1974) (Freedom of Information
Act Amendments); S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. Nmws 6916 (Privacy Act Amendments).
54 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641 (Fees Act) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). For congressional
discussion of Alyeska, see 121 CoNG. lEc. 26,806 (1975); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908,
5909; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
n5 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & An. NEws 5908, 5909.
5B The statutory provisions covered by the Fees Act include 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976) (equal rights under the law to all persons); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)
(equal property rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. m 1979) (liability for depriving
a citizen of rights under color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. 11 1979)
(conspiracies to abridge civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976) (liability for failure
to prevent violations of § 1985); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1686 (1976)) (discrimination in educational programs); Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979)) (racial discrimination in
federally assisted programs).
1981]
170 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
spects: "' it helps to open -the courtroom to citizens with valid
claims, despite their financial constraints, and it forces violators of
basic civil rights to bear the burden of their actions.58
The Fees Act makes an award of attorneys' fees a matter of
discretion for the court.59 Congress intended that prevailing plain-
tiffs under the Fees Act "should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award un-
just." 10 Consistent delineation of such special circumstances has
proved to be a difficult task for the courts. In essence, however, a
finding of special circumstances represents a judgment about a
case's particular facts. 61 Such findings have not been commonly
used to deny attorneys' fees because of the financial structure of the
attorney-client relationship.
6 2
57 See supra note 5.
58See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5908, 5909; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1976). For the legislative history of the Fees Act, see SuBco~mrvrr ON
CONSTiTUONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE CoMmiTTEE ON THE JUDiAnY, 94TH
CoNG., 2D SEss., Cvar RiGHTS A7TroNaE's FEEs AwARDs AcT OF 1976 SotucZ
BooK (Comm. Print 1976).
59 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
60S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5908, 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
61 Some courts have denied or reduced awards because of a noticeable lack of
public benefit resulting from the suit. See, e.g., Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp.
454 (D. Minn. 1979); Zarcone v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd,
581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Naprstek v.
City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
Courts also have denied or reduced awards when a large award would have
impaired the defendant's ability to rectify the error. See, e.g., Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 414-15 (D. Colo. 1977); cf. Oliver v. Kalamazoo
Bd. of Educ., 576 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1978) (concurring opinion) (court may con-
sider limited nature of public resources in determining attorneys' fees). But see
McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 757 (S.D. IMI. 1978).
Finally, courts have denied or reduced attorneys' fees when the plaintiff's dam-
ages under the claim prevailed upon were either too large, e.g., Buxton v. Patel,
595 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) ("adequate compensation to counsel was
provided from the recovery"); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) (chances of receiving "substantial"
award were sufficiently high to attract competent counsel on a contingency fee
basis), or too small, e.g., Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979)
(attorney's fees may be reduced if award is nominal); Huntley v. Community
School Bd. of Brooklyn, 579 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1978) ("moral victory" won was
of "insufficient magnitude" to justify awarding attorney fees); Beazer v. New York
City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), revd, on other grounds, 440 U.S.
568 (1979) (benefits to plaintiff class were not sufficiently concrete).
62 See, e.g., Puch v. Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Regalado
v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Ill 1978); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs. v. G & U,
Inc., 465 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Aumiller v. University of Del., 455 F.
Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd., 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1979); cf. Arkansas
Community Orgs. v. Arkansas State Bd., 468 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
("organizational counsel" awarded fees even though he received a general salary
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III. A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT OF THE ATTORNEY
A determination whether awards of attorneys' fees for student
lawyering are consistent with precedent requires an examination
of courts' interpretations of the word "attorneys" in attorneys'
fees. A court could approach this problem in two ways. The
first is formal and would conclude that attorneys' fees may be
awarded only to licensed lawyers. The second is functional and
would conclude that attorneys' fees may be awarded to recognize
the performance of legal services even if they are not provided by
licensed attorneys.
Two lines of decisions indicate that courts generally have taken
a functional rather than a formal approach in defining "attorneys"
in this context. In the first line of cases, courts have included in
fee awards separate compensation for the services provided by the
"legal" support staff: paralegals, student clerks, or summer
associates.63
The functional concept of "attorney" justifies this treatment
of legal support staff. Separate compensation is appropriate for
nonlawyers if their work otherwise would have to be performed
by an attorney." In fact, legal support services, like an attorney's
from plaintiffs). But see Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd. on
other grounds, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); cf. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465
F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Il. 1978) (attorney's fees reduced from time when payment by
legal aid fund became certain; before this time, fee was contingent).
63 See, e.g., Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1196, 1210 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976);
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 964-65 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1979), modified,
619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700, 711
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd. mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978); Computer Statistics,
Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Dorfman v. First Boston
Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 373-74 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Contra CTS Corp. v. Electro
Materials Corp., 476 F. Supp. 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Scheriff v. Beck, 452
F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D. Colo. 1978).
04 See Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526
F.2d 1196, 1210 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976) ("'most
attorneys engaged in the antitrust practice use... legal assistants ... [to perform]
much of the work heretofore performed by relatively inexperienced lawyers'")
(quoting the district court); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 77,
83 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("The work performed by them is work of a kind necessary to
the prosecution of the litigation which will, or ought to be, performed, if not by
them, by attorneys"); Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1352
(S.D. Tex. 1976) ("paralegals perform valuable legal services previously performed
by young attorneys"); Merchandise Nat'l Bank v. Scanlon, 86 III. App. 3d 719,
726-27, 408 N.E.2d 248, 254-55 (1980) (certified senior law student separately
recompensated for performing tasks that otherwise would have been performed by
an attorney); cf. Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 455 F. Supp. 781, 788 (D.D.C.
1978) (law clerks not compensated because it could not be determined whether
work otherwise would have been performed by an attorney).
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services, are often valued at the market rate, allowing for a margin
of profit. 65
In a second line of cases, courts have evaluated requests for
attorneys' fees from pro se plaintiffs. These cases support the
proposition that courts have taken a functional approach in de-
fining "attorneys." Their holdings do not fall into a well-defined
pattern; fees may be awarded to a pro se litigant in one court 16
and be denied in another.67 Regardless of result, however, the rea-
sons usually employed by the courts to reach their decisions are
instructive.
An award of fees to a pro se representative presents persuasive
evidence that the formal approach has been rejected. For example,
in Holley v. Acree,68 the court granted a nonlawyer's request for
attorneys' fees and observed that when persons choose to represent
themselves in legal proceedings "they are in every sense functioning
as attorneys: they do research, file pleadings, and advocate their
cause." 69 Although such language undeniably reflects a broad view
of "attorney" for the purposes of fee awards, support for that view
may be found even in cases denying attorneys' fees.
Significantly, the decisions denying fee awards to pro se liti-
gants often do not turn merely on the lay status of the party. In-
stead, courts have attempted to determine whether the policies
underlying the attorneys' fees provisions would be furthered by
awarding fees even in the absence of a traditional attorney-client
relationship.70 Indeed, some courts have used the same reasoning
65 See, e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 965 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ($35 per hour for student intern); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 477 F. Supp.
1012, 1017 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ($27.50 per hour for paralegal); Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd. mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d
Cir. 1978) ($20.10 per hour for summer associate); Computer Statistics, Inc. v.
Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1976) ($20.00 per hour for paralegals).
But see Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 77, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(fees for paralegal-law clerk services limited to actual or reasonable cost, whichever
is lower).
6s Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Jones v. United States
Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700 (D.D.C. 1979); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
,7 White v. Arlen Realty and Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 923 (1980); Hannon v. Security Nat'1 Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976);
Barrett v. United States Customs Serv., 482 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. La. 1980).
68 Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd without opinion sub nora.
Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
69 Id. 116.
7 0 See, e.g., Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976), in
which the court interpreted the legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976), as precluding attorneys' fees for pro se litigants.
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to deny fee awards to pro se plaintiffs who themselves were
.attorneys.
71
Although neither line of decisions reviewed here provides con-
clusive support for fee awards recognizing student lawyering, both
.suggest that the concept of "attorney" relevant to the awards
mechanism is a functional one. Were fee awards as a matter of
definition available only to licensed attorneys, the decisions award-
ing fees to lay persons would be plainly incorrect; moreover, the
reasoning in decisions denying fee awards would be superfluous.
Recognition that the student-client relationship is, in most respects,
functionally indistinguishable from the attorney-client relation-
ship 72 leads to the conclusion that court awarded fees based on
.student lawyering would be consistent with prior interpretations of
the fee awards provisions. Indeed, Congress recently recognized
this functional concept in the Equal Access to Justice Act, which
-authorizes attorneys' fees awards to nonlawyer "agents" when an
-administrative agency permits such "agents" to appear before it.7
IV. SHOULD COURTS AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
LAW SCHOOL CLINICS?
In Jordan v. United States Department of Justice,74 the plain-
tiff, who had been denied access to certain documents by the De-
partment of Justice, prevailed on the merits in his suit under the
Freedom of Information Act.75 He requested $17,000 in attorneys'
fees, including $2,000 recognizing the work of law students at one
of Georgetown University Law Center's legal clinics.7 6 Judge
Aubrey Robinson denied the request for attorneys' fees, terming
Cf. Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (lay advocate was
not the "competent counsel" the Fees Act attempts to encourage).
71 For example, in White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th
-Cir. 1980), the plaintiff, an attorney appearing pro se, prevailed in twelve counts
under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976). The court
denied attorneys' fees, finding that the goal of the statutes attorneys' fees provision,
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (1976), was to provide both legal expertise and a de-
tached and objective perspective. Although the plaintiff had sufficient legal
-expertise to win the case, the court reasoned that an award of attorneys' fees would
not further the goal of providing detached and objective counselors.
72 See supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
73 Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325
(to be codified in 5 U.S.C. § 504); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
,(1980).
74 89 F.R.D. 537 (D.D.C. 1981).
75 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
76 89 F.R.D. at 541.
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the record-keeping "abysmal" 77 and the billing rates "excessive." 7
Moreover, he considered the request for fees for student services
"unprecedented and unsupportable" 79 because "law clerks are not
attorneys" 80 and "were free to the Plaintiff in this case." 81
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus,82 Judge Robinson extended
his explanation why it is inappropriate to award attorneys' fees to
law school clinics. Plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Law
and Social Policy, included a claim for $7,050 for the services of
law students in their request for attorneys' fees.83 The court
granted the request, reasoning that the Center incurs substantial
costs in maintaining a student intern program and that these costs
would properly be billed to a client.8 4 Thus, they are compensable.
In Jordan, by contrast:
Plaintiff's attorney was a law school clinical program whose
primary function is to educate law students. The law
school and the students were engaged in a quid pro quo;
the students paid tuition to the "attorney" in return for
course credit and legal training. Through their contract
with the law school, the students themselves paid the
"costs" associated with their contribution to the litigation.
Thus, the students were provided to Plaintiff's "attorney"
(and thus the Plaintiff) cost-free. Since the "attorney"
could not properly bill Plaintiff for the cost-free services
of the law students, the costs would not be properly
billed to his adversary.0
Judge Robinson articulates several objections to awarding
attorneys' fees to law school clinics: that their students are not
lawyers and are not paid, that they do not charge clients for their
services, and that receiving fee awards is incompatible with their
educational nature. This analysis, however, uses a formal rather
than a functional definition of "attorney" and focuses primarily






82515 F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C. 1981).
83 515 F. Supp. at 971. The requests were filed under the attorneys' fees pro-
visions of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976), and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b) (2) (Supp. I1 1979).




.other aspects of the attorney-client relationship that may make fee
awards for student lawyers appropriate. Moreover, it fails to
tecognize that attorneys' fees mechanisms are addressed not only to
the prevailing plaintiff but also to the motives and behavior of the
losing party.s6
The validity of Judge Robinson's objections may be assessed
by comparing the features of a university legal clinic with those
.of a legal services office and those of a private law firm. The law
firm bills clients and pays salaries to attorneys and student clerks.
The firm may be awarded attorneys' fees that include compensa-
tion for the paid student clerks' work.87
A legal services office has salaried attorneys, but it does not bill
clients. Nevertheless, the office Il is eligible for fee awards.8 9
-Courts have recognized that a contrary rule would thwart the
purposes of statutory attorneys' fees provisions.9 0
88 See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text; infra notes 94-97 and accom-
panying text.
87 See Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Doff-
man v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 374 - (E.D. Pa. 1976). Contra CTS
Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp., 476 F. Supp. 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denying
fees to compensate for law student services rendered to corporation counsel).
88 The awards provisions generally call for awards to the prevailing party. If
that party, however, has no obligation to pay his or her attorney, courts have
,awarded the fees directly to the attorney. In doing so, the courts apparently have
not been troubled by this deviation from statutory language. Those courts that have
addressed the question have concluded that their equity powers allow such devia-
tion to prevent a "windfall" to the prevailing party. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Hairston v.
R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1975).
89 The courts generally have refused to condition fee awards on the existence
of the client's contractual obligation to pay an attorney for his or her services. See,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 913 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Brandenburger
v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (cases holding that the presence
of an attorney-client relationship is itself sufficient). Awards of fees to public
interest firms or to other legal assistance offices, as well as to pro bono representatives
from the private bar, therefore, have been upheld. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall,
641 F.2d 880, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1304-05
(9th Cir. 1980); Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1978); Hairston v.
R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1975); Incarcerated Men v. Fair,
507 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1974). Commentators have applauded this line of
.decisions. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 34; Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in
Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301 (1973); Comment, supra note 49;
Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 411 (1973).
9o The award of fees to legal aid offices and other groups furnishing
pro bono publico representation promotes the enforcement of the under-
lying statutes as much as an award to privately retained counsel. Legal
services organizations often must ration their limited financial and man-
power resources. Allowing them to recover fees enhances their capabilities
to assist in the enforcement of congressionally favored individual rights.
.Rodriguez, 569 F.2d at 1245.
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Legal clinics neither charge their clients nor pay their student
attorneys. As the North Slope decision indicates, however, a fee
award may be based on the work of student volunteers. In that
case, the court found that the Center and its clients bore the costs
of operating the student program. Universities, however, also bear
the costs associated with clinical programs. Clinics are simply more
expensive to operate than large lecture classes.91
Thus, Judge Robinson's objections may be reduced to one: fee
awards are incompatible with the educational mission of legal
clinics. The validity of this objection, however, might be better
assessed by the educators at the universities, who presumably are in
the best position to decide whether litigating for attorneys' fees
furthers the goals of clinical education. They may believe that
such litigation would expose students to an important area of ac-
tual practice and teach them the value of carefully recording the
time spent on each matter.
More importantly, if a law school clinic may not be awarded
attorneys' fees for student lawyering, the policies of the attorneys'
fees mechanisms will suffer and the rights of the clinic's clients may
be abridged. For example, the bad faith exception is designed to
punish the offending party and to deter similar conduct in the
future.92 Were bad faith awards generally unavailable to clinical
programs, legal adversaries of individuals represented by law stu-
dents would have license to harrass their opponents with impunity,
with consequent harm both to the client and to the integrity of
the legal system. Accordingly, a general policy that clinical pro-
grams should not receive attorneys' fees under the bad faith excep-
tion not only would fail to advance the goals of the doctrine but
also would implicitly sanction the very conduct it was designed to
eliminate.
Equally persuasive reasons exist to justify awards under statu-
tory provisions designed to encourage vindication of substantive
rights of legislative policies, such as the Fees Act.9 3 A purpose of
these provisions is to promote the ability and willingness of the
bar to represent indigent persons. 94 The prospect of a fee award
91 See supra note 11.
92 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
94 See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir.
1974); Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Alsager v.
District Court, 447 F. Supp. 572, 577 (S.D. Iowa 1977). Generally, law school




may not influence the decision whether to represent a particular
client; the granting of an award, however, certainly enhances an
organization's ability to provide similar services to others.95
This reasoning is equally sound when applied to clinical pro-
grams. The resources of these programs and their universities are
not infinite; indeed, imposing budgetary restrictions on clinical
programs may be an ever-present temptation. Attorneys' fees
awards to law school clinics, therefore, could contribute to their
continuing viability. Such awards also would be consistent with
other policies promoted by the fee provisions-for example, deter-
rence of socially undesirable conduct. As the court noted in Rod-
riguez v. Taylor, "assessing fees against defendants in all circum-
stances may deter wrongdoing in the first place." 91 Finally, when
the remedy sought is nonpecuniary, such as injunctive relief, the
offending party often has little to lose by waging a protracted battle
against an indigent plaintiff. The possibility of a fee award at the
conclusion of the litigation may be a clinic's most powerful instru-
ment in settlement negotiations.97 Without consistent application
of the awards provisions in all circumstances, clients of clinical
programs are deprived of the bargaining power possessed by persons
who have secured other forms of representation. Not only is this
manifestly unfair to the clinic's client, but its practical result also
is an unjustifiable windfall to the defendant. 98
V. CONCLUSION
Provisions and doctrines allowing courts to award attorneys'
fees are designed to further a number of different interests. Rec-
ognizing these interests, the courts have adopted a functional in-
terpretation of attorneys' services and have refused to condition
fee awards on the existence of a particular form of attorney-client
ViSee Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v.
Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976).
96 Rodriguez, 569 F.2d at 1245; see also Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163,
168-69 (8th Cir. 1980) (statutes purpose of awarding attorneys' fees to deter
wrongdoing is furthered by awarding fees to legal services attorneys); Page v.
Preisser, 468 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (disparate payments to public
interest and private attorneys might detract from deterrent effect of fee shifting).
9 7 Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1980); cf. Alsager v.
District Court, 447 F. Supp. 572, 578 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (counsel's ability to
induce settlement not impaired because the fees actually awarded not substantially
different from those that would have been awarded to private counsel).
9 Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1980); Palmigiano v.
Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1980).
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relationship. Law students in clinical programs often provide the-
same services to their clients that an attorney would provide; their
work advances the same interests and values as the work of licensed
attorneys. There is no justification for differentiating between
these two groups in a way that thwarts the avowed purposes of the-
awards provisions and the interests of the students' clients, simply
because the students are students.
